The Uprising Begins – Life in the Green Zone was good into the Fall of 2003; we worked hard and played hard. But it was a false sense of security as Sunnis displaced in May from their former military and government livelihoods began to strike back in late summer by bombing the UN mission and Jordanian Embassy and deploying Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) against Coalition military vehicles. 408 American soldiers were killed from June 1 to December 31, 2003, almost 3 times the number during the conflict.
The Sunni insurgency then struck at the heart of the Green Zone on October 26. Around 6:20 am, a donkey cart carrying a disguised rocket launcher was led down the road across from the Al-Rasheed Hotel that housed CPA staff, stopped, and fired 10 rockets at the building. I was on the 10th floor and had four rockets hit around my window. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz on a visit to CPA was staying on the 12th Floor. His team quickly got him out of there. An Army Lt. Colonel was killed and 15 individuals wounded.
Green Zone life after that attack changed dramatically. We moved out of the Al-Rasheed into other camps, and night-life became very subdued. Insurgents used IEDs to attack CPA convoys to and from Baghdad Airport, and against Bechtel vehicles travelling to work sites. Suicide bombers attacked Iraqis in line at security checkpoints to enter the Green Zone. Rocket attacks into the Green Zone became more frequent, although mostly ineffective. A colleague came home one day and found a hole in the ceiling and an unexploded rocket embedded in his couch where he usually sat to watch tv. Another evening, lots of gunfire erupted around the Green Zone, and I thought that we were under attack. Found out later that the Iraqi national football team had won an important soccer match, and it had been celebratory gun fire – lots of it!
“We got him!” – On December 13th CPA summoned all staff to a large auditorium for a major announcement. With great anticipation, we watched as Amb. Bremer and CJTF-7 Commander LTG Ricardo Sanchez came onto the stage. Bremer only said, “Ladies and Gentlemen, we got him”, and we all knew who the ‘him’ was, the Ace of Spades in the military’s card deck of High-Value Targets. The place went wild; Iraqi staff and media were screaming and crying tears of joy.
Based on intelligence and painstaking analysis of the Sunni tribal networks near Tikrit, Saddam’s hometown, a Special Forces task force and units of the 4th Infantry Division found him hiding in a spider hole. Saddam’s sons – Uday and Qusay – had been killed in a firefight with the 101st Airborne Division in Mosul in July. Other High-Value Targets like Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz (died in prison 2010) and Chemical Ali (executed 2010) – the general who used chemical weapons to kill at least 5,000 Kurds – had either surrendered, been killed, or were captured. Saddam was executed by hanging for his crimes on December 30, 2006.
Violence escalates – Starting in the fall of 2003,there was a dramatic increase in attacks against the Coalition, and then the Sunni insurgency pivoted in March 2004 to attack Kurds and Shi’as. Al-Zarqawi led one of the most lethal Sunni insurgent groups. 200 Shi’a were killed by car bombs in early March. April became a turning point in the sectarian conflict when well-organized Shi’a militias, including the Mahdi Army led by cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, entered the conflict against Coalition forces as well as Sunni terrorists. The intense First Battle of Fallujah pitted Coalition forces against Sunni insurgents in April. The fighting against Coalition forces would continue until late August 2004.
Reconstruction work, especially in Baghdad, slowed. But Bechtel’s local Iraqi staff of 300 engineers were able to continue supervision and quality control despite the violence. Rocket attacks on the Green Zone were daily occurrences. USAID made contingency plans to evacuate most expat staff to Jordan and operate from there but never had to implement an evacuation.
Bechtel Corporation Camp in Uday Hussein’s Palace in Baghdad’s Green Zone (courtesy of TW)
In May, I decided that after a year in Baghdad, it was time to go home. I remember flying out to Amman and upon arrival felt a great weight being lifted off my shoulders – the stress of being in Iraq. I was so tired and drained. A few weeks later, our classmate Rick Whitaker took my place in Baghdad. CPA transferred full sovereignty to the Iraqi Interim Government on June 28, 2004. CPA was no more.
What do I think about OIF? – First of all, Saddam was pure evil, and I supported the OIF objective of overthrowing his regime. The trick was how to assist Iraq to become a democratic regime, when the conflicts and sectarian differences among Sunnis, Shi’as, and Kurds were so strong, and not have this new regime be co-opted by Iran, its powerful Shi’a neighbor to the east. 20 years later, my judgment is that the transition to democracy – while bumpy – has largely succeeded. Iraq has a working democracy despite the internal sectarian and religious divisions.
Iraq certainly has assisted Iran diplomatically and militarily, for instance by allowing transit of supplies from Tehran across Iraq to Syria. Iran trains and backs Shi’a militias. Baghdad balances this by allowing bases for US forces, mainly to train Iraqi forces and fight ISIS. Iran has significant influence in Baghdad, but I don’t see Iraq as its lackey.
However, USG’s stated justifications for removing Saddam — Iraq was developing WMD and had links to al Qaeda — while sincere were not anywhere close to reality. These were based on faulty analysis at the CIA and elsewhere. Remember CIA Director Tenant’s comment to President Bush about the case for WMD, “It’s a slam dunk.” I asked a top UN weapons inspector before the invasion what he thought about Iraq’s WMD. He replied that he believed that Saddam got rid of them in late 1990s after his son-in-law, an Iraqi General, defected to Jordan and revealed what he knew. That appears to be what happened. Little evidence of WMD was ever discovered after the occupation, and there never was a connection proven between Saddam and al Qaeda.
US planning for OIF was highly successful on the military strategic and tactical side but woefully inadequate on the Phase IV side, how to stabilize and rebuild the country. The White House would not or could not bring together DoD and civilian departments to form a plan.
Finally, the irony is that US set out to disrupt what was thought to be state support for terrorism where, in fact, there was none; and then CPA’s decisions to disband the Iraqi Army and fire Ba’athist party members helped create one of the most vicious terrorist groups ever — ISIS with which we are still fighting.
Again, Tom, thanks for the captivating insights!
Best regards & BOTL,
Bill
Tom. in 2003 I was just beginning my 3 year sports ministry in England. That was a joyful and totally stress-free time for my wife and I as on weekends we would travel country lanes in search of a quaint pub for lunch or supper. I cannot imagine what even one year in Baghdad must have been like for you and your wife back home as you entered your seventh decade of life. Thanks for sharing your story. You did us all proud. God bless.
Thanks, Tom; that was insightful. We started out with a Days Forward summary of how creative a society started in Mesopotamia, and learned that the Muslim takeover became a societal cesspool and remains so.
Tom, both components of the story were most enlightening. My son was an infantry officer in the 101st Airborne division who served in Iraq, so I got the troops version of what was happening. Your two stores were amazing, showing how political impacts can affect major military considerations. The Great American Public reading/watching the news back home certainly missed out on such key events. Thanks so much for providing an education.
Thanks for Part 2.
In sum. yours is a fascinating experience and analysis. I agree with virtually all of what you write and, since I have zero first hand experience there, I must bow to your much closer examination of events. However, I have two potential issues with your summary.
First, Saddam reportedly allowed the training of 4-5,000 terrorists on Iraqi soil annually. There were records found which indicated some of these were al Qaeda. It is not a direct a linkage showing targeted support, but it is a linkage.
Second, while what was actually found in Iraq indicated a nuclear program at best in its infancy, or at worst abandoned. The more recent purchases of yellow cake uranium, and the obstruction of nuclear inspections by Saddam were either because he had an active nuclear program which was effectively dismantled, or they were designed to make his enemies in Iran and elsewhere believe he had an active nuclear program, something with which to reckon. I tend to favor the latter idea. I think he wanted to keep the West and his Middle East enemies guessing and the ruse became his downfall. It certainly fooled the CIA.
Though some evidence was found, very little was found of his chemical weapons program either. I suspect, like the more advanced jets he buried in the desert to protect them from destruction, he either buried stockpiles in the desert, or had them carted them off to Syria where Bashar al-Assad later used them against his own people.
I happened to be playing “War” with my 8, 6, and 4 year-old grandchildren this summer with our “Iraqi Most Wanted Playing cards” and I had a lot of explaining to do when they asked me about the faces on the cards! Perhaps I should have played “Old Maid” instead!