Iraq – Inside the Green Zone – 2003

     The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, ushered in a new phase of warfare for the United States that became known as the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). It started with American paramilitary forces entering Afghanistan in late 2001 to eliminate al Qaeda leadership and then in March 2003 became an invasion of Iraq to overthrow the regime of Saddam Hussein in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and destroy what was thought to be Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. In Iraq, Afghanistan and other countries encountering terrorism and insurgency, the US Government also funded through State Department and US Agency for International Development (USAID) ‘soft power’ programs: governance, health, education, reconstruction, stabilization, and countering violent extremism (CVE).

     This is the story of my involvement on the civilian side of GWOT across 16 countries from Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Colombia, Syria, Somalia, Nigeria and points in between, where instability and violent extremism were the norm.

     The saga begins in early January 2003, when I received a phone call asking me to interview for an undisclosed position: “You have a military, Mideast, infrastructure background and we’d like to speak with you about an infrastructure position that we can’t disclose right now but you can read the papers and figure it out.” Long story short, by mid-January I became the USAID Director of Iraq Infrastructure Reconstruction seconded to LTG (ret.) Jay Garner’s Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) and thus began a 16-month journey in Iraq overseeing on behalf of the US $3.2 billion of reconstruction contracts primarily implemented by Bechtel Corporation.

     Much has been written about how unprepared the US was for “the day after” Saddam’s defeat when the Coalition would become the occupying authority with total responsibility for all state functions. I can only say that the criticism is well-deserved. The Defense Department did not prioritize planning for Phase IV — activities conducted after decisive combat operations to stabilize and reconstruct the area of operations (AO), and the White House did not push together DoD and the necessary civilian departments to develop a detailed plan. Senior Defense officials shut out civilian departments from most planning, and the CENTCOM Commander, in particular, had no interest in Phase IV.  I heard that there had been one civ-mil Phase IV planning conference in late December 2002, but there was little coordination or follow-up after that initial meeting. No one at senior levels heeded Secretary of State Colin Powell’s Pottery Barn rule: “You break it, you own it.”   

     On St. Patrick’s Day, we flew to Kuwait City, and Coalition forces attacked Iraq three days later. By April 9, the V Corps led by LTG Scott Wallace (https://thedaysforward.com/scott-wallace/) had entered Baghdad. In late April, the USAID contingent drove up the Euphrates River valley to Baghdad. I remember playing Meatloaf and Abba CDs at high volume all along the way. President Bush declared an end to hostilities on May 1.

     ORHA and CPA – We set up shop with the rest of ORHA at the Palace, Saddam’s garish palatial monstrosity located on the Tigris River next door to the palace of Uday, his sadistic son.

This secure area became known as the “Green Zone”.

             

The Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) supported the USAID reconstruction program by providing an outstanding team of officers and civilian engineers for the Owner’s Engineer role overseeing contractual compliance and quality of design and workmanship. Bechtel’s first task was to propose an infrastructure reconstruction program by mid-June for all sectors except the oil industry that was separately handled by a USACE task force. We had to determine needs and prioritize them across the sectors of power, water & sanitation, telecoms, schools, health clinics, Umm Qasr seaport, and the Baghdad International Airport.

     Two Major Mistakes – In April, we learned that ORHA and Jay Garner would be replaced by Amb. L. Paul Bremer, head of the newly created occupation governing body, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). In mid-March before our departure to Kuwait, Jay had told the President and National Security Council that it would be a huge mistake to disband the Iraqi Army and to fire all Ba’athist party members, most of whom were the technocrats running the government. He ended by saying that if that was what they wanted, he was not their guy. So, it was no surprise 4 weeks later when Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld called to say that Amb. Bremer and CPA were taking over.

     New CPA staffers – the “true believers” politically connected to the White House – soon arrived in Baghdad and began to enforce what the White House wanted. In mid-May, CPA’s first decree, despite opposition from the US military, was to prohibit any Ba’ath party member from working in the new government and ministries; up to 100,000 well-educated Sunni individuals were out of a job. In late May, again against the recommendations of the US military, CPA disbanded the Iraqi Army, thus alienating several hundred thousand soldiers and setting the stage for the formation of al-Qaeda in Iraq that later became ISIS.

     Chaos Rules – Meanwhile, chaos was erupting across Iraq as gangs and ordinary citizens looted and plundered Ministry office and infrastructure facilities. Coalition forces could only secure oil facilities, power plants, and the airport. In mid-April at the end of hostilities, there were only 14 high-voltage transmission towers damaged from the fighting. By mid-July there were more than 600 towers destroyed as well-organized gangs harvested the copper for sale to Iran. All the major water treatment and sanitation plants in major cities were vandalized as gangs took everything – generators, office equipment, etc.

The power generation sector was in shambles from years of neglect and deferred maintenance. Out of roughly 11,000 megawatts (MW) of installed generator capacity, at the most it could only provide 4,400 MW, an efficiency of under 40%, and usually it was much less. Preventive maintenance was not enforced, and spare parts were hoarded. Plant staff were afraid for their livelihood and lives if Saddam became upset when power levels dropped because a generator had to be shut down for maintenance. Instead, they rewired systems to bypass alarms so that when a generator finally gave out, they would be able to say, “It was God’s Will.” Needless to say, rolling blackouts were the norm because the power system could only provide half of the estimated demand of 7,000 MW. CPA made an important decision that power-rationing would be shared equitably across Iraq unlike under Saddam where Baghdad received 20-24 hours per day at the expense of the rest of the country that only received 2-8 hours a day.

     Looting also significantly damaged the national and regional control centers that were essential to managing the power system. Communication between the control centers, power stations, and switchyards was only restored after Coalition forces distributed satellite phones to Iraqi managers around the country. Looters also helped themselves to warehouses of arms and ammunition.

CJTF-7, the Coalition military headquarters, simply did not have enough troops to guard all infrastructure, and the military’s rules of engagement precluded them from initiating deadly force to deter these gangs even if troops did come upon acts of looting. CPA and the Iraqis could only watch in frustration as the system was dismantled. I estimate that the Coalition’s inability to stop the looting probably doubled or tripled the cost of rebuilding the power sector.

Reconstruction underway – By July 2003, the USAID reconstruction plan prepared by Bechtel was approved. 50% of the funding went to the power sector to repair transmission lines and increase generation of electricity. Other major projects were rebuilding water and sanitation facilities in Baghdad and other major cities; reopening Umm Qasr port near Basra so that imported grain shipments could resume; rebuilding three major bridges damaged during the conflict; and refurbishing primary schools and health clinics. As the general contractor, Bechtel did an excellent job of mobilizing to Baghdad, conducting assessments, preparing the reconstruction plan, recruiting and building capacity of local Iraqi staff and construction companies, and providing quality control on construction sites. But the scale of what needed to be done was only now coming into focus: Congress approved appropriations of $20 billion for reconstruction work that would fall under CPA authority and be implemented by USACE.